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Admiralty
By George H. Chamlee*

A commentator recently had the temerity to suggest that the reasons for
the existence of admiralty law and the admiralty jurisdiction as a separate
system of jurisprudence "are not immediately apparent."' Certainly the
survival of admiralty as a largely unique body of law serving the needs of
a single industry must be considered remarkable in this era of judicial
reform and modernization. Admiralty is one of the few areas of legal specialization still left where law can frequently be justified on the basis of
history rather than reason.
If the work of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals is any indication,
admiralty is in no danger of extinction. The Fifth Circuit dealt with a wide
range of maritime problems during 1976. The court was particularly concerned with the subject of damages in collision and wrongful-death cases
and with governmental activity in shipping and the regulation of maritime
affairs. The court considered in some detail the jurisdictional aspects of the
1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, but failed to reach a case dealing with claims by harbor workers
against shipowners and other third parties.
The cases selected for comment in this article are those primarily concerned with the proper interpretation and application of principles of admiralty law. Cases concerned largely with reviewing the fact findings of
trial courts and juries have been. excluded.
I.

PRAcTICE AND PROCEDURE

The subject of interlocutory appeals in admiralty was considered by the
court in a personal-injury case, O'Donnell v. Latham,' in which a member
of a fishing party sued both the boat owner and his liability underwriters.
The trial court dismissed the underwriters on the ground that the leasing
* Partner in the law firm of Chamlee, Dubus & Sipple, Savannah, Georgia. A.B., Mercer
University (1951); LL.B., Mercer University (1952). Member of the Georgia Bar and the
Maritime Law Association of the United States.
1. Morse, The Conflict Between The Supreme Court Admiralty Rules and SniadachFuentes: A Collision Course? 3 FLA. STATE U. L. Rrv. 1 (1975). The author suggests that inrem and quasi-in-rem procedures historically employed by Anglo-American admiralty courts
for centuries and incorporated into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1966 in the form
of Supplemental Admiralty Rules probably violate modern notions of due process, since they
permit prejudgment seizures of property without a preliminary judicial hearing.
2. 525 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1976).
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of the boat violated the policy terms. Upon appeals by the injured claimant
and the insured boat owner, the underwriters moved to dismiss the appeal
and argued that the dismissal order was not "final" under 28 U.S.C.A.
3
§1291.
The Fifth Circuit declined to dismiss the appeal. It pointed out that
special provision is made for appeals from interlocutory orders in admiralty "determining the rights and liabilities of the parties."' Since the
order decided the issue of the underwriters' liability, it was appealable
under admiralty procedure even though it did not terminate the entire
litigation on its merits and did not decide the issues as to all parties. No
certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) was necessary,
since the rule does not supersede the special statutory provision governing
interlocutory appeals in admiralty.5 .
A merchant seaman's privilege of filing suits and appeals without prepaying costs was put to the test in companion cases, Araya v. McLelland,
and Souyoutzis v. "M/V Georgios K.",, This small but revered concession
of a grateful sovereign to seafarers is said to be "attributable to their
hardships and privations, not shared by the landbased workers.", The
claimants in these two cases wished to have their respective vessels arrested on wage claims without prepayment of the U.S.-Marshal's attachment fees. In compliance with a statute applicable generally to arrests in
admiralty, the Marshal had demanded a $1,000 deposit to cover estimated
insurance, wharfage and maintenance costs while the ship remained in
custodia legis.9
3. "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the
district courts of the United States.
28 U.S.C.A. §1291 (1966).
4. "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from: ... [interlocutory
decrees of such district courts or the judges thereof determining the rights and liabilities of
the parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed . . ." 28
U.S.C.A. §1292(a)(3) (1966). This procedure is said to be an outgrowth of the practice in
admiralty of first deciding the liability issues and then referring the damage issues to a special
master. By means of an interlocutory appeal, the liability findings can be reviewed before
the damage issues are tried. See 9 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTICE §110.19[3] at 209-210 (2d
ed. 1975).
5. In multiple-party cases in which the court enters an order or opinion deciding the issues
with respect to less than all the claims or parties, the judgment is not final under FED. R.
Civ. P. 54(b) unless the court also certifies that "there is no just reason for delay" in entering
final judgment with respect to the party or claim affected.
6. 525 F.2d 1194 (5th Cir. 1976).
7. 525 F.2d 1197 (5th Cir. 1976).
8. M. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN §677 (3d ed. 1970). This exemption is statutory and
applies to fees, costs and the furnishing of security. 28 U.S.C.A. §1916 (1966). It has historically been applied to suits by foreign seamen as well as American seamen. The "Roseville",
11 F. Supp. 150 (W.D. Wash. 1935).
9. "The marshals shall collect, in advance, a deposit to cover the initial expenses for such
services and periodically thereafter such amounts as may be necessary to pay such expenses
until the litigation is concluded..." 28 U.S.C.A. §1921 (1966).
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The Fifth Circuit ruled that the expenses incurred by the court in preserving and safeguarding the attached vessel could not be paid from public
funds, so it supported the Marshal's refusal to arrest without the deposit.
The court acknowledged that the two statutes, providing respectively for
the seaman's exemption and the Marshal's deposit, were "irreconcilable"
facially; however, the deposit requirement was accorded precedence, since
it was enacted subsequently and the failure of Congress to expressly except
seamen from its requirements was presumed to be deliberate. °
In Labit v. Santa Fe Marine, Inc.," the court dealt with the "missing
witness" rule commonly encountered in maritime cases when geographical
factors present difficult problems in assembling witnesses and documents
for trial. The rule recognizes that the fact-finder may infer that a witness'
testimony is unfavorable to the party who does not produce him to testify
if it is shown that the witness has relevant knowledge and is employed by
that party or is reasonably available to that party but not to the opposition.' 2 The rule also applies to relevant documents and other materials
3
within the control of a party who fails to produce them at trial.'
In the Labit case, the defendant shipowner failed to call a supervisory
employee who had been in charge of the plaintiff's work detail at the time
the plaintiff was injured. The plaintiff had already taken the prospective
witness' deposition, and the supervisor was present in the courthouse during the entire trial. Under these circumstances, it was held, the trial court's
refusal to give a "missing witness" instruction at the plaintiff's request was
not an abuse of discretion.
II.

COLLISION

The tragic collision of the "African Neptune" with the Sidney Lanier
Bridge at Brunswick, Georgia, on election night in 1972 was the subject of
FarrellLines, Inc. v. Jones.' To clear the Brunswick harbor on its way to
sea, the ship should have executed a 50-degree turn to port to shape up
for the bridge draw opening directly ahead. The ship's helmsman, however,
turned the wheel starboard instead of to port at this critical juncture and
10. "As a precept of statutory construction, we find more compelling the notion that, in
resolving an irreconcilable conflict between successive statutory enactments, the later enactment should be given primary consideration." Araya v. McLelland, 525 F.2d 1194, 1196 (5th
Cir. 1976).
11. 526 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1976).
12. Annot., 68 A.L.R. 2d 1072 (1959).
13. "The non-production of material evidence which is in the control of a party raises an
inference that that evidence is unfavorable to that party . . . .This rule has been said to be
particularly applicable to suits in admiralty, where records are often crucial and records and
witnesses often are in the control of one party." Tupman Thurlow Co. v. S.S. "Cap Castillo,"
490 F.2d 302, 308 (2d Cir. 1974). See also, Slan v. A/S Det Danske-Franske D/S, 479 F.2d
288 (5th Cir. 1973).
14. 530 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1976).
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the collision resulted. Ten people were killed. The shipowner petitioned the
trial court to limit liability on the ground that the ship's navigational
errors were not within the "privity and knowledge" of the shipowner.15 The
trial judge ruled that the shipowner had failed to establish effective procedures to oversee the helmsman's execution of pilot orders and denied limitation.'
The general scheme of the Limitation of Liability Act is to permit the
corporate shipowner to limit his liability for ship-inflicted torts that are not
traceable to the managing officers of the corporation, the unseaworthiness
of the ship, or the unfitness of the crew. 7 In the language of the statute,
the injury must be done "without the privity or knowledge of [the] owner"
for the liability to be limited."8
The negligent acts of the crew are not considered to be within the privity
or knowledge of the shipowner if the crew is competent and if they have
been properly instructed about their duties.' In substance, the trial judge
concluded that the crew had not been properly instructed with respect to
the prevention, detection and correction of helm errors.21
The Fifth Circuit disagreed and reversed. The court observed that the
shipowner had published a "manual for ship's officers" that required the
watch officer to see that all steering and engine orders were promptly and
properly carried out. The court concluded that the number of personnel on
the navigation bridge at the time of the casualty was adequate and that
the watch officer was capable of overseeing the helmsman while also making bell book entries and handling the engine order telegraph.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Clark commented that the shipowner and
the ship's master should have foreseen the dangerous potential of any
rudder error while the ship was so close to the bridge. He suggested that
the owners "should have taken a moment to tell those about to be charged
with this ultrahazardous undertaking what to expect and how they could
minimize or prevent hazard to life and limb in the maneuver that lay
ahead.""'
With respect to the responsibilities of the master, the dissent is fair
comment. The hazard was certainly foreseeable; however, the master's
15. Complaint of Farrell Lines, 1976 A.M.C. 1657 (S.D. Ga. 1974).
16. "The procedures used by the owner and those in command of the 'African Neptune'
on the night of the collision were inadequate and did not include 'fail safe' precautions
assuring avoidance of the collision with the Sidney Lanier Bridge." Id. at 1658.

17.

3

BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY

§42 (7th ed. 1975). The limitation privilege is severely

circumscribed if the vessel is owned by an individual, particularly if he is aboard at the time
of the casualty. See, e.g., Tittle v. Aldacosta, 544 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1977).
18. 46 U.S.C.A. §183(a) (1958).

19. 3 BENEDICT

ON ADMIRALTY

§42 at 5-17 (7th ed. 1975).

20. "The failure to prevent or detect the mistake of the helmsman could have been
avoided by adoption and use of proper procedures in the approach of the vessel to the Bridge."
Complaint of Farrell Lines, 1976 A.M.C. 1657, 1659 (S.D. Ga. 1974).
21. 530 F.2d at 14.
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negligence is not imputable to the shipowner to prevent limitation of liability. 2 The comment is hardly realistic as applied to the shipowner. It is akin
to charging the Greyhound Bus Lines with the duty of instructing one of
its drivers how to negotiate a particular curve in a highway. Thousands of
such perils lie in the path of any ocean-going vessel, and the shipowner
must of necessity rely upon the professional skills of his master and crew
to avoid these perils. The shipowner's responsibility is to man his vessel
with a competent crew. If he fails to do this, he cannot limit his liability
for their errors.
In two other collision cases, the court was concerned with the proper
measure of damages.
The S/S "Hermosa," while docking, inflicted heavy damage to a dock
structure. The shipowner did not seriously contest his liability but instead
directed his attack at the damage claim. The sum sought by the dockowner included an engineering charge representing work performed by
employees of the plaintiff corporation. The shipowner argued that he
should not be assessed with damages for work done by salaried employees,
since this did not cause any additional expense to the plaintiff.
In FreeportSulphur Co. v. SIS "Hermosa,,13 the Fifth Circuit didn't buy
this argument. The court described the argument as being "wholly based
on speculation," since it presupposed that the staff engineers could not
have been used in other company work.2" If repairs are performed internally
by an injured party, the court said, overhead is recoverable in addition to
other expenses incurred.
The court directed most of its attention to the problem of computing the
credit to be given the shipowner for the enhancement in value of the dock
resulting from the repairs. Nothing is to be gained by tracing the labyrinthine convolutions of the court in reaching its conclusions. Suffice it to say
that those conclusions were essentially as follows:
1. The most commonly used method of computing depreciation, the so-called "straight-line" method, 5 should be used only if
"the expected useful life of the property after repairs is the same
as it was at the time of its acquisition by the plaintiff.""
2. No deduction for depreciation should be made if the repairs
do not extend the useful life of the property "as it existed just
before the collision. 2 7
22. 3 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY §42 at 5-17 n. 4 (7th ed. 1975); Tittle v. Aldacosta, 544 F.2d
752, 756 (5th Cir. 1977).
23. 526 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1976).
24. Id. at 303.
25. Under this method the percentage of depreciation is applied to the cost of repairs and
the product thus arrived at is deducted from the cost of repairs to produce the recoverable
damages. Id. at 304.
26. Id. at 305.
27. Id. at 305-306.
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3. If the repairs extend the useful life of the property "to a
different degree from the expected useful life of the property at the
time of its acquisition by the plaintiff," 8 the following formula is
to be used to determine the useful life extension deduction: Take
the total number of years of useful life of the property after repairs
and divide it into the total number of years that the life of the
property was extended by the repairs. This calculation will produce a percentage that can then be applied to the total repair costs
to arrive at the deduction for the useful life extension.
The court also considered and rejected a unique theory of damages advanced by the trial court, although the panel was divided in its reasons for
rejection. The trial judge theorized that the plaintiff should be allowed
interest on the amount deducted from the repair costs for the extension of
useful life, since the collision required the dock-owner to make this capital
outlay earlier than would otherwise have been necessary. Two judges on
the panel concluded that this element of damages would violate the general prohibition against recovering for expenditures that enhance the value
of the plaintiff's property. Nevertheless, the majority left the door open for
the plaintiff to prove, on remand, any loss sustained as the result of
"premature extension costs."
Another collision case, Skou v. United States, 0 raised the issue of lost
profits from a charter while the vessel was undergoing repairs necessitated
by the collision. The trial court had found that the plaintiff had failed to
prove an actual loss resulting from ten days' detention for repairs, since
the ship did not lose the charter it was preparing to undertake when the
collision intervened. The Fifth Circuit thought otherwise. The owner of the
damaged vessel had been delayed nine days in performing the charter and
in consequence of this delay the plaintiff had actually lost nine days' hire
for the vessel.
III. JONES ACT SEAMEN
The ingenuity of lawyers in their efforts to transform shoreside workers
into Jones Act seamen in order to avoid the limitations imposed by the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act never ceases to
3
amaze. 1
In Holland v. Allied Structural Steel Co., 3 a steelworker employed by a
steel-erection company to assist in the construction of the 1-20 bridge over
28. Id. at 306.
29. Id. at 307.
30. 526 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1976).
21. The Longshoremen's Act expressly excludes from its coverage "a master or member
of a crew of any vessel ...." 33 U.S.C.A. §902(3) (Supp. 1976).
32. 539 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1976).
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the Mississippi River had fallen from the structure and was killed when
he hit a cofferdam 60 feet below.33 A $200,000 jury verdict for the plaintiff
was appealed by the employer, and the Fifth Circuit ruled that a directed
verdict should have been granted for the defendant. The appeals court
found no evidence in the record that the steelworker had ever performed a
substantial part of his work on a vessel or that he was contributing to the
function of any vessel at the time of his death. At most he had assisted
sporadically in offloading steel from barges at the work site and traveled
short distances on the river to bring the barges to the river bank. To qualify
for seaman's status, the worker must have "performed a significant part
of his work aboard the ship with at least some degree of regularity and
continuity."'3' Incidental and temporary duty does not suffice, the court
said.
An important element in the case was the fact that the steelworker was
not engaged in vessel-related tasks at the time of his death. Seaman's
status may be created temporarily if a worker performs with regularity
some part of his principal duties aboard and in aid of the vessel's mission
and is injured while about these duties.
May the wife of an injured seaman recover from the shipowner for loss
of consortium? Faced with this question in Christofferson v. Halliburton
Co., 31the court took a conservative approach and upheld admiralty's traditional denial of this common-law remedy. The court observed that the
policy of the Jones Act and the Federal Employers' Liability Act (on which
the Jones Act is based) was to abrogate the claims of relatives. And, although the general maritime law has adopted many common law doctrines, the wife's claim for loss of consortium has never been uniformly
recognized by courts in the United States. 7 Nor was the court persuaded
by the argument that the U.S Supreme Court in the Gaudet case3" had
recognized a right of recovery for loss of society by dependents in maritime
wrongful-death actions. 9 The simple answer to this, said the appeals court,
is that the plaintiff's claim for loss of consortium does not arise out of the
33. Id. at 486.
34. Id.
35. "While his work [aboard the vessel] may have been sufficient to afford him seaman's
status during the period of his occupation with the tasks aboard the tender, such an isolated
period of working as a seaman does not enable him to carry that title into perpetuity." Keener
v. Transworld Drilling Co., 468 F.2d 729, 731 (5th Cir. 1972).
36. 534 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1976).
37. The claim first received general recognition in the United States in 1950, when Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), was decided. Georgia, like many other
states, approved the consortium claim following the Hitaffer decision. See Brown v. GeorgiaTennessee Coaches, Inc., 88 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 24 (1953). See also Annot., 36 A.L.R.
3d 900 (1971).
38. Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
39. Id. at 585-590. The Court does make the following comment in a footnote: "Damages
for loss of consortium have been awarded by courts of admiralty as well." Id. at 589 n. 25.
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death of her husband.
When viewed against the background of the liberal remedies available
to seamen and harbor workers under the maritime law, it is hard to fault
the admiralty courts for failing to recognize a claim for loss of consortium.
The line must be drawn somewhere, and the approach of the Fifth Circuit
in dealing with the consortium claim seems entirely proper.
How much care does the law require that a seaman exercise to insure
his own safety? This was the dominant issue in Webb v. Dresser
Industries.0 The plaintiff was a seaman who had been sent ashore to pick
up ship supplies at a bus station during the Alaskan winter. Wearing
smooth-soled boots, he slipped on snow and ice and was injured. In his suit
he contended that the the shipowner breached its warranty of seaworthiness by failing to supply him with suitable equipment to carry out his
duties. Both the trial court and the Fifth Circuit court agreed.
The appeals court acknowledged that merchant seamen are required to
furnish their own clothing and that the shipowner has no obligation to
provide boots for all of the shoreside assignments of seamen; nevertheless,
when a seaman is required to work "under foreseeably adverse circumstances," the shipowner must make suitable footwear available to him.',
The seaman has a lesser but corresponding duty to take available precautions for his own safety. The court said that despite the traditional
solicitude shown by the courts for the welfare of seamen, they may not "use
unsafe equipment and methods in the face of an available safe alternative. "'42The case was remanded to the trial court to make findings about
the plaintiffs contributory negligence.
Gueho v. Diamond M. Drilling Co. 3 illustrates the extreme care which
must be exercised in settling any case with a merchant seaman. A shipowner who settles a claim with a seaman is subject to the same scrutiny
by the courts as is a guardian settling an account with his ward. The
shipowner "must affirmatively show that no advantage has been taken;
and his burden is particularly heavy where there has been inadequacy of
consideration. "

Gueho was not represented by counsel, and he settled with an insurance
adjuster acting for the shipowner's insurer.' 5 The insurer took the precaution of having the settlement reviewed and approved by a U.S. district
court judge. Immediately after the settlement was formalized, the ship40. 536 F.2d 603 (5th Cir. 1976).
41. Id. at 607.
42. Id. at 608.
43. 524 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1975).
44. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 247 (1942).
45. Attempting to settle with a seaman who is unrepresented or who has counsel who are
not aware of his rights is a high-risk undertaking for any shipowner. See Morris v. Fidelity &
Cas. Co., 321 F. Supp. 320 (E.D.La. 1970).
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owner fired the seaman who predictably retained counsel and filed suit
to vacate the settlement. The trial court found that the insurance adjuster
during the settlement negotiations assured the seaman he would not lose
his job. The $18,000 settlement was set aside and, after trial, a $25,000
judgment was entered against the shipowner. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.
IV.

CARGO

Wirth, Ltd. v. SIS "Acadia Forest"' was a significant decision on cargo
movements. The Fifth Circuit held that a LASH barge is a "vessel" entitled to assert defenses provided in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act'
against claims for cargo damage sustained while the barge is being towed
from its loading berth to the marshaling area to be loaded aboard the
mother vessel.
A LASH barge-"lighter aboard ship"-serves as a floating container.
After being loaded aboard the barge at the loading port, the cargo need not
be handled again until it reaches its ultimate overseas destination. During
the ocean leg of the total cargo movement, the loaded LASH barge is
carried in the hold or cargo space of the LASH mother ship.
The barge in question was en route from Brake, Germany, to Bremerhaven, where it was scheduled to be loaded aboard the "Acadia Forest."
While the barge was transiting a lock in the river system, however, a line
from one of the tugs parted. The barge struck the lock structure and ultimately sank, with consequent damage to the cargo.
In the absence of a statute, the general maritime law still adheres to the
common-law rule that a common carrier is an insurer of the cargo it undertakes to carry."8 The defending shipowner relied on the COGSA exemption
from liability for errors in the navigation or management of the ship.4" To
avoid that exemption, the plaintiff cargo-owner had to show that during
the river movement of the LASH barge, the COGSA defenses were not
available to the shipowner because the barge was not a "vessel used for the
carriage of goods by sea.""
In an exhaustive opinion, the court reviewed the history and purposes
of COGSA and concluded that the act would be frustrated by the plaintiff's interpretation, since the shipowner would be absolutely liable for
46. 537 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1975).
47. "COGSA," 46 U.S.C.A. §§1300-1315 (1975).
48. 537 F.2d at 1276. See also Chamlee, The Absolute Warranty of Seaworthiness, 24 MER.
L. REv. 519, 523 (1973).
49. "Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or
resulting from . . .[aict, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot, or the servants of
the carrier in the navigation or in the management of the ship.
"46U.S.C.A. §1304(2)(a)
(1975).
50. The COGSA definition of "ship" is as follows: "The term 'ship' means any vessel used
for the carriage of goods by sea." 46 U.S.C.A. §1301(d) (1975).
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cargo damage during the barge movement." The court subscribed to the
principle that "vessels which are part of a common maritime enterprise
should be viewed as one vessel in the eyes of the law.""2 Answering the
argument that the barge was nothing more than a container, the court
noted that each barge was built to Coast Guard standards and registered
.with Customs. 53

The court's conclusion that the LASH barge is a "ship" under COGSA
is, of course, crucial to the continued viability of the LASH concept. Any
other result would defeat the use of the barge as a floating container to
move cargo over inland waterways to. deep water ports, since the carrier
would be severely intimidated by the risks of liability necessarily assumed
during the barge movement.
V.

WRONGFUL DEATH

Seventeen Coast Guard crewmen lost their lives in 1968 when a freighter
collided with their vessel on the Mississippi River. Their survivors filed
suits in 1968 and 1969 under the Louisiana wrongful-death statute. In
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc. in 1970, the U.S. Supreme Court
recognized for the first time a right of action for wrongful death under the
general maritime law,' but in 1974 in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet
the Court rejected mental suffering of surviving relatives as an element of
that action." The survivors of the Coast Guard crewmen, relying on Louisiana law rather than Moragne and Gaudet, advanced claims for their mental suffering. When the trial court allowed the claims, the stage was set
for the Fifth Circuit, in In re SIS "Helena,"" to determine whether state
law had been supplanted by federal law in maritime wrongful-death actons.
In reaching its conclusion that state wrongful-death statutes no longer
have any application in admiralty, the court first decided that the Su51. "[Tlhe barge would be subject to general maritime law and ... would be unconditionally liable for injury to the cargo except for the pre-Harter exceptions." 537 F.2d at 1279.
52. Id. at 1282.
53. Id. at 1283-1284.
54. 398 U.S. 375 (1970). The Court overruled its earlier decision in The "Harrisburg," 119
U.S. 199 (1886), that there is no right of action for wrongful death in admiralty in the absence
of federal legislation. At the time the Moragne case was decided, there were two federal
maritime death statutes, the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. §688 (1975), applicable to seamen, and
the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C.A. §761 (1975). However, there was no federal
death statute which applied to claims arising on U.S. territorial waters if the decedent was
not a Jones Act seaman.
55. 414 U.S. 573 (1974). "Loss of society must not be confused with mental anguish or
grief, which is not compensable under the maritime wrongful death remedy. The former
entails the loss of positive benefits, while the latter represents an emotional response to
wrongful death." Id. at 585-586 n. 17.
56. 529 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1976).
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preme Court's Moragne decision should be applied retroactively to claims
arising before the date of the decision. 57 The next question was whether
Moragne provided a death remedy in admiralty that supplemented the
available state remedies enforced by admiralty courts prior to Moragne, or
whether the new maritime right of action preempted the field and precluded any further reliance upon state wrongful-death statutes in cases
falling within the admiralty jurisdiction.
The court reviewed the history of admiralty reliance upon state death
statutes and concluded that this reliance was justified only by the absence
of any comparable remedy under the general maritime law.5" The intention
of the Supreme Court in Moragne was to fashion a new federal admiralty
right of action which could be applied uniformly. Obviously this objective
of uniformity would be compromised if the courts could continue to draw
from the hodgepodge of state statutes and the state court decisions interpreting them. The court was also influenced by the Supreme Court's concern about the inappropriateness of employing state remedies to compensate claimants for the violation of duties imposed by federal maritime
law.5"
The case was remanded to the trial court, which was to formulate an
award allowing survivors damages for "loss of society" as sanctioned by the
Supreme Court in Gaudet, but eliminating any compensation for "mental
anguish or grief."
In another death case, Solomon v. Warren,0 the court was concerned
with claims for the deaths of a couple who were guest passengers in a
private airplane which was lost at sea on a flight from Curacao to Barbados. The suit was filed under the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA)8 '
rather than under the general maritime law. 2 Since DOHSA does not
57. Id. at 748.
58. Before its Moragne decision, the Supreme Court had divined a congressional intention
"to preserve state sovereignty over deaths caused by maritime torts within the State's territorial waters." The "Tungus" v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 593 (1959).
59. "Federal law, rather than state, is the more appropriate source of a remedy for violation of the federally imposed duties of maritime law." Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,
398 U.S. 375, 401 n. 15 (1970).
60. 540 F. 2d 777 (5th Cir. 1976).
61. 46 U.S.C.A. §761 (1975).
62. The court's opinion fails to explain why counsel for the plaintiffs elected to proceed
exclusively under DOHSA, but a footnote says that the parties agreed on this course of action.
Id. at 780 n. 2. Perhaps counsel concluded that admiralty jurisdiction, essential to an action
under the Moragne-Gaudet doctrine, was doubtful under Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v.
Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972). The Supreme Court strongly implied in Executive Jet that
admiralty jurisdiction existed in aviation cases if the aircraft in question was proceeding on
a transoceanic flight at the time of the casualty. 409 U.S. at 271. Alternative pleading of both
DOHSA and Moragne-Gaudetwould seem to be the most advantageous approach under these
circumstances. See 2A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE §8.31(2) (1975). The Fifth Circuit has
already suggested that Moragne has replaced DOHSA. Law v. Sea Drilling Corp., 523 F.2d
793, 796 (5th Cir. 1975).
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include a provision for survival rights, the Florida survival statute was
pleaded."'
Much of the appeals court opinion is concerned with the measure of
damages under DOHSA which bases recovery on "the actual pecuniary
benefits that the decedent's beneficiaries could reasonably have expected
to receive from the continued life of the decedent."" A much broader
recovery is possible under the Supreme Court's Gaudet doctrine, which
allows compensation for both loss of support and loss of society."
In summary, the Fifth Circuit approved awards to each child for loss of
support, loss of parental guidance and training through minority, loss of
schooling or formal education at college level, and loss of inheritance. The
court disapproved an award for loss of parental guidance and training after
reaching majority, reasoning that any such loss would fall into the category
of "companionship and affection" which is not compensable under
DOHSA.16
The panel was divided in its opinion about the award for loss of inheritance to the children of the decedents. The majority was satisfied that the
thrifty habits of the decedents made an inheritance of future property
accumulations reasonably expectable." Judge Gee disagreed. 8 He felt that
estate accumulations based largely on investments are too uncertain to
form the basis for an award. He was also troubled by what he considered
to be a double recovery by the surviving children when they received the
existing estate by inheritance and were simultaneously awarded sums
representing the fruits of investing this same property over the projected
life expectancies of the decedents.
VI.

LONGSHOREMEN'S

AcT

The 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act" will occupy the attention of the court for many years
to come. Cases involving important issues under these amendments have
been slow to reach the Fifth Circuit. Future cases involving §5(b) of the
amendments7 ° will be of the most importance to the admiralty bar, since
they will determine how much exposure to liability a shipowner has for
63. Under Moragne, "no resort to state law is necessary" for a claim based on survival
rights. Roberson v. "N.V. Stoomvaart Maatschappij", 507 F.2d 994, 995 (5th Cir. 1975).
64. 540 F.2d at 786 (5th Cir. 1976).
65. Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 584-590 (1974).
66. 540 F.2d at 789 (5th Cir. 1976).
67. Id. at 791-792.
68. Id. at 799-800.
69. 33 U.S.C.A. §§901 notes, 902, 903, 905-910, 912, 913, 914, 917, 919, 921a, 928, 933, 935,
939, 940, 944, 948a, 949, 950 (Supp. 1977).
70. 33 U.S.C.A. §905(b) (Supp. 1977). This section permits an action by covered employees against vessels when they are injured "by the negligence of a vessel."

19771

ADMIRALTY

ship-related accidents involving harbor workers. The Fifth Circuit has not
yet dealt with a significant case in this category.7
On the purely workmen's compensation level, the court decided
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue,7" a potpourri of five employeremployee claims, all of which were essentially concerned with how far
inland the coverage extends under the amended Act. The new approach is
to replace the "water's edge" test of coverage 3 with a new test requiring a
showing of both maritime employment and the occurrence of the injury
within a situs described in the statute."
Two of the claims were made by shipyard workers who were injured at
locations substantial distances away from the repair yard. One man was
punching out after completing his shift, and the other was helping to
dismantle a building to salvage the steel in it. Neither location had anything to do with the repairing of ships, and the claims were denied. 5
Another claim was made by a dock worker who was injured while helping
to secure a gantry crane to a railroad flat car. Several days before the
injury, the crane had been discharged from a vessel to a "point of rest" in
the waterfront area." The employer maintained that the claimant was not
engaged in the work of loading or unloading a vessel, since the actual
discharge of the crane from the ship had been completed long before the
accident occurred. Not so, said the court. The work being performed was
''an integral part of the process of moving maritime cargo from a ship to
land transportation.""
The court also held that a shipbuilder is no less a shipbuilder because
his particular phase of the work is being carried out in a shop some 300
feet from the vessel being repaired."
The lessons to be learned from this case may be summarized as follows:
1. Longshoremen and dock workers who are involved in the
71. Cases decided by other circuit courts include: Bess v. Agromar Line, 518 F.2d 738 (4th
Cir. 1975); Griffith v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 521 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1975); Dodge v.
Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 528 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1975); Shellman v. United States
Lines, Inc., 528 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1975); Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp., Panama,
540 F.2d 757 (4th Cir. 1976).
72. 539 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1976). See also Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544
F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1976).
73. "As a general rule, an employee's injury was compensable if it occurred upon the
" 530 F.2d at 537.
navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock) ....
74. "Congress has replaced the old 'water's edge' analysis with a two-part test which
requires (1) that the claimant have been engaged in 'maritime employment' and (2) that the
injury have taken place upon the situs specified in the Act." Id. at 538.
75. Id. at 541-542.
76. "Point of rest" is a term of art used by terminal operators to describe the point in a
cargo movement across their docks at which they receive and take custody of the cargo from
the discharging vessel.
77. 539 F.2d at 543.
78. Id. at 543-544.
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movement of cargo between the ship and the vehicle that brings
the cargo to the terminal or takes it away are covered if injured
while carrying out this type of work.
2. A maritime worker who is injured at a site not customarily
used by his employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building
a vessel at the time of the accident is not covered.
One of the changes wrought by the 1972 amendments was to transfer to
a hearing examiner the deputy commissioner's power to conduct hearings. 7 In Bartheleny v. J. Ray McDermott & Co.,'* a claimant had secured
a favorable ruling from a deputy commissioner following a hearing held
after the effective date of the amendments. When this ruling was vacated
by the Benefits Review Board on the ground that the deputy commissioner
was without jurisdiction to issue the order, the claimant appealed.
Affirming, the Fifth Circuit said it was the purpose of the amendments
to divide the administrative and adjudicatory functions under the Act
between the deputy commissioner and the hearing examiner. Nothing contained in the amendments suggested that the deputy commissioner could
retain jurisdiction of pending cases after the effective date of the amendments.
VII.

GOVERNMENTAL

ACrTIY

The federal government is involved in many aspects of the shipping
industry, both in its regulation and its promotion, as well as in the improvement and protection of the navigable waterways of the United
States. "s Inevitably this involves the government in litigation. Typical
cases in this category of maritime litigation were reviewed by both the
Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit during this survey period.
The Supreme Court heard an appeal by a Philippine shipowner who lost
a fishing vessel in a collision with a U.S. destroyer. The Philippine company brought an action in a U.S. district court against the government
under both the Public Vessels Act (PVA)' 2 and the Suits in Admiralty Act
(SIA),3 two statutes under which the United States partially waives its
sovereign immunity in claims falling within the admiralty jurisdiction.
The trial court dismissed the case on the ground that the PVA bars any
action by a foreign national whose government does not permit U.S. citi79. "All powers, duties, and responsibilities vested by this chapter, on October 27, 1972,
in the deputy commissioners with respect to such hearings shall be vested in such hearing
examiners." 33 U.S.C.A. §919(d) (Supp. 1977).
80. 537 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1976).
81. See the discussion of "governmental activity in shipping," G. GILMORE & C. BLACK,
THE LAw OF ADMnLTY 958-996 (2d ed. 1975).
82. 46 U.S.C.A. §§781-790 (1975).
83. 46 U.S.C.A. §§741-752 (1975).

1977]

ADMIRALTY

zens to sue in its courts "under similar circumstances."8 ' There was no
showing that the Republic of the Philippines granted reciprocal privileges

to aliens.
The plaintiff, on appeal to the Supreme Court in United States v. United
Continental Tuna Corp., " contended that the SIA contains no reciprocity
requirement and it permits the government to be sued in any case in
which, if the government were a private citizen, it could be sued in admiralty. The PVA with its reciprocity clause, went the argument, had been
superseded and supplanted by the SIA.
In its original form, the SIA applied only to vessels operated by the
government as "merchant vessels," the Court said. Its counterpart, the
PVA, applied to "public vessels" such as naval vessels and Coast Guard
vessels. The two statutes were mutually exclusive and required that actions be brought in the district courts in admiralty. Much jurisdictional
confusion was generated by the fact that admiralty tort claims not covered
by the SIA or the PVA had to be filed in the district court on the law side
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, while admiralty contract claims had
to be filed in the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act.8" Consequently,
Congress amended the SIA in 1960 to eliminate the "merchant vessel"
limitation and opened up the SIA to all admiralty claims against the
government in which, if it were a private party, it would be suable. s7
The issue, as stated by the Supreme Court, was "whether Congress
intended, by the deletion of the 'employed as a merchant vessel' proviso
from the [SIA], to authorize the wholesale evasion of the restrictions
specifically imposed by the [PVAI on suits for damages caused by public
vessels. ' 8 The Court concluded that there was no indication that Congress
intended by its amendment of SIA to abolish the distinction between
merchant vessels and public vessels. Suits based on claims against public
vessels are still subject to the reciprocity requirement.
The government's liability for the failure of the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers to maintain project depths in a ship channel was at issue in
Canadian Pacific (Bermuda) Ltd. v. United States.81 A vessel outbound
from Jacksonville, Florida, grounded on a shoal in the channel. A Corps
survey made four months prior to the incident showed no shoaling in the
quarter of the channel where the grounding occurred. The district court,
entering judgment for the shipowner, reasoned that the Corps failed to give
84. "No suit may be brought under this chapter by a national of any foreign government
unless it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court in which suit is brought that said
government, under similar circumstances, allows nationals of the United States to sue in its
courts." 46 U.S.C.A. §785 (1975).
85. 425 U.S. 164 (1976).
86. Id. at 173.
87. Id. at 167.
88. Id.at 169.
89. 534 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1976).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

proper notice of the shoaling, failed to resurvey after it became aware that
shoaling was occurring in the area, and failed to eliminate the shoaling by
timely dredging.
The Fifth Circuit reversed. The Corps has no legal duty to survey or to
dredge a navigable waterway at any particular time or place, the court
said." Although some shoaling had been discovered in the vicinity of the
grounding during the last survey, there was no evidence that the Corps had
any advance knowledge of the condition which actually caused the grounding; thus it did not mislead the local navigational interests.
This case is of some significance, since it is the first circuit court decision
squarely holding that the Corps is not liable for damages resulting from
its failure to maintain project depths at all times in all parts of a channel."
The decision implies that the Corps might be liable if it failed within a
reasonable time to communicate its knowledge of a known restriction in
the channel that might pose a hazard to navigation.
The government's regulatory role was an issue in two other cases coming
before the Fifth Circuit.
United States v.LeBeouf Brothers Towing Co.'2 was an action by the
government to enforce Coast Guard penalties assessed against vessels for
minor oil spills. The shipowners protested that the compulsory reporting
requirements of the federal water pollution statutes 3 forced them to provide the evidence on which the penalties were based, in violation of their
Fifth-Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. No constitutional
issue was presented because the self-incrimination privilege was not available to corporations, said the Fifth Circuit. The only question to be decided
was one of statutory interpretation: whether the penalties assessed were
civil or criminal within the congressional intention, since the statutes expressly prohibit the use in criminal cases of information contained in compulsory reports."' The congressional intention is manifest, said the court,
since the statute itself describes the penalty as "civil."' 5
The scheme of a Florida land-developer to circumvent the licensing
requirements of the Corps of Engineers as applied to navigable waters was
90. "In short, we find no duty imposed on the Corps, or assumed by it in the present case,
to survey or dredge the channel . . . at any particular time or place." Id. at 1170.
91. "The precise question before us, that is, the extent of the duty owed to navigators by
the Corps of Engineers in regard to the existence of shoaling conditions in navigable waters,
to our knowledge, has not been answered by the Supreme Court or this circuit." Id. at 1168.
92. 537 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1976).
93. Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 33 U.S.C.A. §1161 (1970); Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C.A. §1321 (Supp. 1977); Refuse Act, 33
U.S.C.A. §§407 (1970).
94. "Notification received pursuant to this paragraph or information obtained by the
exploitation of such notification shall not be used against any such person in any criminal
case . . ."33 U.S.C.A. §1161(b)(4) (1970).
95. 33 U.S.C.A. §1161(b)(5) (1970).
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weighed and found wanting in United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc."
The developer, desirous of providing "waterfront" privileges to his mobile
home customers, constructed a series of ten canals, all shoreward of the
mean high tide line (MHTL), which the Corps had adopted as the limit
of its jurisdiction. The developer assumed that by deliberately constructing his canals beyond the Corps' self-imposed jurisdictional boundary, he
could avoid the Corps' troublesome administrative licensing requirements.
The government objected, filed suit against the developer, and secured a
judgment requiring restoration from the lower court.
The case was complicated by the -fact that five of the canals opened into
an adjoining sound, over which the Corps clearly had jurisdiction, while
the remaining five were "plugged" and entirely landlocked.
The fact that activity affecting navigable waters takes place beyond the
MHTL, the traditional boundary of admiralty jurisdiction, does not in any
way limit the federal regulatory function, said the Fifth Circuit. The five
canals which opened into the sound and provided access to the sound by
watercraft from the developer's lots both altered the course of the navigable sound and, by the introduction of boats into the waterway, affected its
navigable capacity. Clearly the Corps had jurisdiction over the five open
canals.
The plugged canals, however, were landlocked and did not connect with
navigable waters constituting a federal avenue of commerce. 7 The fact
that the plugged canals were affected by tidal fluctuations made no difference. The Corps' jurisdiction, said the court, does not reach "every hole
dug in South Florida.""
96. 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976).
97. "The inland lakes of various States are navigable but, having no navigable outlet
linking them with our system of water-ways, have never been held to be public waters of the
United States." 1 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY §143 (7th ed. 1974).
98. 526 F.2d at 1299.

